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Abstract 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of institutions on incomes of workers 
in developing countries by rigorously addressing the question as to whether changes in minimum 
wages can change the inequality of the distribution of earnings. More specifically, we analyze 
whether changes in Costa Rica’s complex institution of multiple minimum wages in the 1980s 
and 1990s acted as a countervailing force to the unequalizing effect of globalization. Using 
annual data on workers from the 1987-1997 household surveys, it is shown that changes in the 
legal minimum wages did indeed have an effect on wage inequality and that these changes would 
not have been captured using the simple interpretation of minimum wages found in much of the 
literature.  
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1.  Introduction 
A considerable number of studies have shown that earnings inequality of workers around 
the world has widened with the onset of globalization, and that rising wages of skilled workers 
relative to unskilled workers is an important cause of this increase in inequality. Various 
explanations exist for the rising relative wages of the skilled to unskilled workers in Asia, Latin 
America and the US during the 1980s and 1990s.  Most authors believe that changes in the 
demand for labor favoring the skilled are more important than changes in the supply of skilled or 
unskilled labor, but there is still much controversy as to what is driving the changes in demand.  
Some claim trade liberalization is the primary source (offering mechanisms other than those 
proposed in the Hecksher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuleson models) whereas others point to skill-
biased technical change (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1996), which can be driven by trade (Pavnick et al., 2002 for Brazil) or by foreign 
direct investment (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997, for Mexico; Skuratowicz, 2000, for Poland; Wu, 
2001, for China).    
Costa Rica was no exception to this trend of globalization and increasing earnings 
inequality.  Earnings inequality rose from 1992 to 1999, as the country introduced trade 
liberalization and other structural adjustment reforms.  Gindling and Trejos (2003) show that one 
of the most important measurable causes of the rise in earnings inequality in Costa Rica was an 
increase in returns to education (skills).  Robbins and Gindling (1999) show that the increase in 
relative wages for skilled workers in Costa Rica was most likely due to changes in the relative 
demand for more skilled workers and is coincident with trade liberalization.  However, Gindling 
and Trejos (2003) also show that a significant part of the change in earnings inequality in Costa 
Rica cannot be explained by measurable factors such as changes in education, hours worked, 
sector of employment, or region of residence.   
We argue in this paper that the institution of the minimum wage is also an important 
factor explaining changes in earnings inequality in Costa Rica and it can be an important factor 
in many developing countries. This study is a departure from the literature on institutions and 
development, which tends to analyze the impact of a more generally defined set of institutions 
using data on a number of countries. (The paper by Katerina Pistor in this volume is an 
example.)   In this paper we analyze detailed changes in one institution in one country, using   2
panel data over time.  We argue that it is important to understand well how institutions are 
structured when trying to measure their impact.  
How might minimum wages impact the dispersion of wages paid in a country?  In 
countries, such as the U.S., where there is only one minimum wage that is considered to be the 
floor for all wages, one might expect to see dispersion rise as the floor falls.  DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996) show that the erosion of the real value of in the minimum wage contributed to 
rising wage inequality in the US in the 1980s.  However, in countries where there is more than 
one minimum wage, one should take into account changes in the whole structure of minimum 
wages when looking at the effects of minimum wages on wage inequality. Costa Rica is such a 
country and, as seen in Table 1, there are at least 40 other countries which have multiple 
minimum wages set by different dimensions (such as occupation, industry and region).  For 
example, in Argentina there are dozens of minimum wages for agricultural workers (set by 
region, activity and occupation) and one wage for all other economic activities.  In Mexico there 
are 267 minimum wages (set by three geographic areas and 88 occupations, plus one general 
minimum wage for each area).  In Brazil there were 39 regional minimum wages from 1963-
1984.
1  Studies of these countries which use only one minimum wage when examining the 
impact of minimum wages on wage inequality (e.g., Cortez, 2001 and Bell, 1997) may provide 
biased estimates of the effect. 
We proceed in Section 2 of the paper to review the findings in previous studies of wage 
inequality in Costa Rica.  In Section 3 we describe the institution of minimum wages and our 
expectations about the impact of these mandated changes on the distribution of minimum wages.  
In Section 4 we describe the data set and provide descriptive statistics on changes in the 
inequality of minimum wages (and wages) over the 1987-1997 period.  We form hypotheses as 
to how the changes in the structure of minimum wages might affect the distribution of wages and 
test them in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
2.  Wage Inequality and Liberalization in Costa Rica 
As shown in Gindling and Trejos (2003), earnings inequality in Costa Rica declined from 
the mid 1970s to the early 1990s and then began to rise.  More specifically, Costa Rica 
experienced a sharp decline in inequality over the 1976-1986 period, a slight decline in the 1987-  3
1992 period and a sharp increase in the 1992-1999.  Using a three-year moving average, the 
variance of log earnings fell by -0.113 in the first period, -0.043 in the second period and it rose 
by 0.072 in the third period. Gindling and Trejos (2003) show that the most important 
measurable factor underlying this pattern of earnings inequality is the changing returns to 
education, which fell over the 1976-1987 period and rose thereafter.   
The rise in the returns to education and earnings inequality coincides with, but is not 
inclusive of all, the period of liberalization. Starting in the mid 1980s Costa Rica, along with its 
Latin American neighbors, began to liberalize trade and open its capital accounts. Costa Rica 
implemented trade liberalization in an explicitly gradual manner. Although a new Central 
American Common Market tariff regime was agreed to in 1985, tariff reductions began only in 
1987 and were allowed a five-year adjustment period.  At the same time, explicit subsidies were 
put into place for certain exports (in apparel, electronic assembly and non-traditional 
agriculture). In the 1990s tax credits for non-traditional exports moved toward more high 
technology products and tourism as subsidies were reduced for labor intensive manufacturing 
exports. All controls on the capital account were removed by 1993 when the Costa Rican 
government began to seek aggressively foreign direct investment.   
Gindling and Trejos (2003) conclude that the increase in the returns to education from 
1987 to 1999 was caused by both supply and demand factors. Robbins and Gindling’s (1999) 
results suggest that relative supply movements were sufficient to explain relative wage changes 
before 1985 but not after 1987, the beginning of the trade liberalization.  They conclude that 
increase in demand for more educated workers was most-likely due to skill biased technical 
change, possibly accelerated by skill-enhancing trade following substantial trade liberalization.    
Most observers would argue that the increase in inequality is not likely the result of 
reduction of labor protection since, like many of its Latin American neighbors, Costa Rica did 
not liberalize the labor market in this period.  In fact, following a long tradition of protecting its 
workers with measures such as universal health care and pension benefits, the government 
passed a law in 1990 that required parity of wages between men and women.  As we show 
below, in 1987 the government did embark on a gradual reform of the minimum wage structure, 
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http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/legrel/papers/index.htm.   4
which we hypothesize counters the wage disequalizing effect of trade liberalization for part of 
the period.  
3.  Minimum Wage Setting 
The 1949 Constitution establishes that every worker has the right to a minimum wage 
which provides a decent standard of living. Further legislation on wage fixing sees minimum 
wages as a means of promoting a fair distribution of income. The standard of living objective has 
been pursued through a continuous process of comparing the purchasing power of minimum 
wages in relation to different baskets. The income distribution objective has been explicitly 
pursued in times of severe crises.  
According to Law 832, minimum wages should be adjusted every year, the new rates 
being valid from 1 January. The body responsible for carrying out this work is the National 
Salaries Council (CNS), a tripartite structure of 9 members elected every four years.
2 The 
Council decides the minimum wage increases (by simple majority voting of its members). In 
addition to this annual fixation, minimum wages can be revised at any time during the year 
following a request of 5 employers or 15 workers. Although the law institutes this alternative as 
an exception, it has been used often to compensate for high inflation rates since 1980.  Since 
1980 minimum wages have been adjusted twice a year, the only exception being 1983 when they 
were adjusted three times. 
In 1987, at the beginning of the period under study, there were 520 separate minimum 
wage rates, which were set by occupation/skill and industry. As the cumbersome nature of this 
system was becoming increasingly apparent, some members of the CNS proposed merging 
minimum wages for similar occupations under more generic titles. This process, which we 
describe below, started in 1988 and within five years the CNS managed to reduce the number of 
minimum wages to 72; by 1997 they were reduced to the 19 minimum wages that we observe 
today.
3    
                                                 
2 Of these three groups, the representatives of the government have the most influence, and the relative bargaining 
power of the representatives of the government has increased since initiation of the first Structural Adjustment Plan 
in the mid-1980s. (Interview with José Pablo Carvajal, Director, National Salaries Council, on May 16, 2002.) 
3 For part-time workers the minimum wage is applicable proportionally. In principle, young workers are subject to 
the same various minimum wage rates as older workers. However, Law 4903 of 1975 enables enterprises to hire 
entrants to the labor market below 21 years of age for apprenticeships. The objective of this program has been to 
facilitate the entrance of young workers to the labor market during periods of crisis. Although used extensively in   5
In 1987, all individuals who worked in the private sector were assigned to a minimum 
wage category that was defined by a detailed industry and occupational classification. The 
industrial categories do not correspond to the Standard Industrial Classification of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), but the aggregated one-digit categories are similar: 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, commerce, transportation and 
communication, services.  Within each of these categories there could be several subcategories 
(e.g., in manufacturing there were 44 subcategories.) The occupational/skill categories were 
specific to the industry, and they too do not correspond to the ILO’s standard classification for 
occupations.  However, they roughly corresponded to: supervisor, skilled employees and 
unskilled workers. For individuals with higher education (professionals) there was a separate set 
of 14 minimum wages by type of occupation, irrespective of industry of job (e.g., librarians, 
nurses, accountants, laboratory technicians and drafters). Finally, another minimum wage was set 
for all workers who had at least a five-year university degree (licenciado), the most common 
terminal university degree in Costa Rica at the time.  
Beginning in 1988, the Ministry of Labor began a gradual process of reducing the 
number of minimum wage categories for non-university educated workers by eliminating the 
variation in wages given by the industrial dimension. Specifically, the Ministry identified a 
broadly-defined occupational (skill) category that was to be harmonized across industries and 
proceeded gradually to increase the lower(est) minimum wage by a greater amount than the 
higher(est) minimum wage within each occupational category.  For example in January 1995, 
minimum wages were decreed for only five (one-digit level) industries: mining, manufacturing, 
construction and electricity were collapsed into one category.  The number of wages within each 
industrial category was also reduced to a total of only 54 wages (for employees with less than a 
university degree).  Over a period of several years, one minimum wage emerged for each 
broadly-defined skill/occupation, irrespective of industry. By the middle of 1997 the industrial 
dimension of the minimum wage was completely eliminated.    
While the number of minimum wages for the non-university educated workers was being 
reduced, the number of minimum wages for workers with higher education became more 
numerous over this period.  In 1993 a new minimum wage was set for individuals with two to 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 1980s, the mechanism has not been used much in the 1990s as unemployment rates were low (Rojas and 
Murillo, 1995).   6
three years of university education (diplomados) and for graduates of five-year technical high 
schools (técnicos). In 1997, another new minimum wage was added for workers with a four-year 
university degree.  Prior to 1993, the minimum wage applying to workers at these education 
levels was the same as the minimum wage applying to less-educated workers in the same 
industry and occupation.  Therefore, the addition of minimum wage categories for these workers 
with higher education should have increased the minimum wage for these workers, increasing 
the gap between the wages of workers with higher education and workers without higher 
education, while at the same time reducing the gap between the wages of licenciados and other 
workers with higher education.  
Beginning in June 1997, there were a total of 19 minimum wages, four for non-
professionals (one each for unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers, skilled workers, specialized 
workers), nine for professionals and six for special categories (e.g., live-in domestics, stevedores, 
journalists).   
Table 2 summarizes the changes in the level of minimum wages from 1987 to 1997. It 
shows that there is a range of rate changes every six months, reflecting the harmonization 
process. Based on the changes described in this table and in the above paragraphs we would 
expect: (1)  a reduction in the inequality of minimum wages among workers without higher 
education as the number of minimum wages for this groups is reduced over the 1987-1997 
period and the lowest minimum wages were raised more than the highest minimum wages in the 
harmonization process, (2) an increase in the gap between the minimum wage of workers with 
higher education and the minimum wage of workers without higher education as the minimum 
wage for workers with technical degrees, two-year and four-year university degrees are added in 
1993-1997, and (3) a reduction in the inequality of minimum wages among workers with higher 
education in the 1993-1997 period as the minimum wage of workers with technical degrees, two-
year and four-year university degrees increases relative to the wages of workers with a 
licenciado degree.  We first test to whether these patterns indeed exist in the data. 
 
4.  Data 
In our analysis we use annual data on a) legal minimum wages, from decrees published 
by the Ministry of Labor, and b) workers, from the annual Household Surveys for Multiple   7
Purposes carried out by the Costa Rican Institute of Statistics and Census.  The household 
surveys have been conducted in July of every year since 1976 on approximately 1% of the 
population.  We use data on approximately 10,000 workers each year from 1987 to 1997, the 
period when minimum wages were simplified.   
We start with 1987 data since this is the year that the occupation categories in the 
household surveys are sufficiently detailed to be able to adequately match the detailed 
occupation/skill/industry categories in the minimum wage decrees.
  We use the 3-digit 
occupational classification available in the household survey, which is not equivalent to the 
I.L.O. standard classification. For illustration, we present in Table 3 the two-digit occupational 
classification in the Costa Rican household survey.  From careful reading of the minimum wage 
laws published every year, we assigned the minimum wage corresponding to each of these 
occupation/skill/industry categories. 
  The structure of legal minimum wages, weighted by the population to which it applies, 
is depicted in Figure 1 with histograms of the minimum wage distribution. The figure presents 
the distribution of real minimum wages (in 1999 colons) among private sector workers who 
report positive earnings in 1988 (at the start of the simplification) and in 1997 (at the end of the 
simplification process).  Spikes in the distribution of minimum wages represent legal minimum 
wages that apply to larger proportions of workers.  For example, starting from the left (the lowest 
minimum wage) in the 1988 graph, the first spike is at the minimum wage for domestic servants, 
who represent approximately 7% of all workers and to whom applies a legal minimum wage of 
123 colones (in 1999 prices) or $0.43 (in 1999 U.S. dollars) per hour.  There are no minimum 
wages over a large range of possible wages between the minimum wage for domestic servants 
and the next minimum wage, which is for unskilled workers (peones and other production 
workers) in most industries. This second spike represents over 20% of all workers.  Next there is 
a cluster of many minimum wages that surround two smaller spikes at the minimum wages for 
operators of machinery and specialized workers (supervisors) in most industries.  Finally, at the 
very right of the distribution of minimum wages (after numerous very small spikes) is a spike at 
the minimum wage of 578 colones or $2.00 per hour (in 1999 prices) set for licenciados (five-
year university graduates) who represent approximately 2% of all workers.   
  The second graph in Figure 1 presents the distribution of (the log of) real minimum 
wages among workers who report positive earnings for 1997.  A comparison of the graphs for   8
1988 with the graphs for 1997 illustrates the changes in the structure of legal minimum wages.  
As in 1988, the spike at the far left of the 1997 distribution of wages is at the minimum wage for 
domestic servants (which again represents approximately 7% of workers) and the second spike 
occurs at the minimum wage for unskilled workers. However, we can see that the simplification 
and consolidation process between 1988 and 1997 compressed the distribution of minimum 
wages around the unskilled wage: while in 1988 the spike at the unskilled minimum wage 
represented 20% of workers, in 1997 the minimum wage for unskilled workers applies to 45% of 
workers. At the same time that the minimum wages for unskilled workers were being 
compressed, new minimum wage categories for workers with higher education were added, 
resulting in several new spikes at higher wage levels, including a spike at the minimum wage for 
four-year university graduates (4% of workers) and at the minimum wage for licenciados (2%). 
In Figure 2 we plot the ratio of the average minimum wage for more educated workers to 
the average minimum wage for less educated workers, where more educated refers to workers 
with higher education (technical high school and university) and less educated refers to workers 
with less than a technical high school education.  It clearly shows that there was an increase in 
the gap between the minimum wage of workers with higher education and the minimum wage of 
workers without higher education as the minimum wage for workers with technical degrees, two-
year and four-year university degrees were added in 1993-1997.  
In Figure 3 we plot the standard deviation of the log of minimum wages, SD(lnMW), for 
all workers and by more or less education.  It shows that, as expected: (1) There was a reduction 
in the SD(lnMW) among workers without higher education as the number of minimum wages for 
this groups is reduced over the 1987-1997 period and (2) there was a reduction in the SD(lnMW) 
among workers with higher education in 1993-1997 as the minimum wage of workers with 
technical degrees, two-year and four-year university degrees increases relative to the wages of 
workers with a licenciado degree.  Facts (1) and (2) caused the SD(lnMW) for all workers to fall 
from 1987 to 1992 but the increase in the gap between the more and less educated, shown in 
Figure 2,  caused the SD(lnMW) for all workers to rise from 1992-1997. 
  The plots in Figure 4 of the standard deviation of the log of wages shows that as the 
dispersion of minimum wages changed, so did the dispersion or inequality of actual wages. 
Figures 2-4 and the summary measures provided in Appendix Table A1 appear to indicate that 
changes in the inequality of legal minimum wages are correlated with the change in the   9
inequality of actual wages.  For example, as the inequality of minimum wages for workers with 
and without higher education fell from 1987 to 1997, so did the inequality of actual wages.  
Further, as the standard deviation of the log of minimum wages for all workers fell from 1987 to 
1992, so did the standard deviation of the log of actual wages for all workers.  Then, as the 
standard deviation of minimum wages rose from 1987 to 1992, so did the standard deviation of 
actual wages.  Note that changes in the inequality of actual hourly wages do not appear to be 
closely correlated with the change in the average or minimum legal minimum wage. 
  These results suggest four questions (hypotheses): (1) Did the increase in the gap 
between the minimum wages of workers with and without higher education cause the gap 
between the actual wages of workers with and without higher education to increase (and 
therefore cause an increase in wage inequality)? (2) Did the reduction in the inequality of 
minimum wages for workers without higher education cause a reduction in the inequality of 
actual wages for these workers?  (3) Did the reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for 
workers with higher education cause a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these 
workers? (4) Did changes in the minimum minimum wage cause changes in the dispersion of 
actual wages? We test these hypotheses in the next section. 
5.  Measuring the Effects of Changes in Minimum Wage Structure on Wage Inequality  
  To test the above hypotheses, we pool the individual data on all salaried workers in the 
private sector for the 1987 to 1997 years and create panel data for seven industries.
4 Using this 
data set, we estimate the following equation with industry fixed effects: 
it t t
T
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) / ln( ) / ln( ,  (1) 
where the dependent variable,  ) / ln( Unskilled
it W Skilled
it W , is the log of the ratio of the average 
real hourly wage of skilled workers to the average real wage of unskilled workers in industry i at 
time t (1987…1997);  ) / ln(
Unskilled
it
Skilled
it W M W M   is the log of the ratio of the average minimum 
wage for skilled workers to the average minimum wage for unskilled workers in each industry in 
each year. We use the term “skilled” to refer to workers with higher education (technical high 
school and above) and by “unskilled” we refer to workers without higher education. The   10
coefficient α1 is an estimate of the impact of the ratio of the minimum wages on the ratio of actual 
wages of skilled to unskilled workers. A positive and statistically significant coefficient (α1), 
would provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis, that the increase in the gap between 
the minimum wages of workers with and without higher education causes the gap between the 
actual wages of workers with and without higher education to increase. We estimate the equation 
using industry fixed effects to control for unobserved differences across industries. To control for 
year-specific factors such as changes in aggregate supply and aggregate demand and the timing 
of minimum wage changes, we include a dummy variable for each year, YRt.   
  The results of the estimation of equation (1) are reported in Table 4. We find that the 
coefficient α1 is positive and statistically significant (specifically, it is equal to 0.632 with a 
standard error of 0.156).  Thus, our results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
increase in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and without higher education 
caused the gap between the actual wages of workers with and without higher education to 
increase.  
  To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the following equation, separately for workers 
with and without higher education and for all workers combined: 
[] it t t
T
1 t
it 1 o it µ YR γ Σ  MW SD(ln W SD + + + =
=
) ) (ln β β ,        (2) 
where the dependent variable is a measure of inequality, i.e., the standard deviation of the log of 
the real hourly wage (in 1999 colones) in industry i at time t (1987…1997); SD(lnMWit) is the 
standard deviation of the log of real  minimum wages in each industry in each year.  We include 
year dummies and estimate the equation with industry fixed effects to control for unobserved 
differences between industries. The coefficient β1 is an estimate of the impact of changes in the 
variance in the legal minimum wage on the variance of actual wages.  A positive and significant 
coefficient β1  would  provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that changes in the inequality 
of minimum wages cause changes in the inequality of actual wages. 
  The results of the estimates of equation (2) are also reported in Table 4.  In the equation 
estimated using data on workers without higher education, the coefficient β1 is positive (0.432) 
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The seven industries are: agriculture, manufacturing, construction, commerce, transportation, communication, and 
services.   11
and significant. In the equation estimated with data on workers with higher education, the 
coefficient β1 is also positive (0.817) and significant. These results provide evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers with and 
without higher education caused a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for each of these 
categories workers.  In the equation estimated using data on both workers without and without 
higher education, the coefficient β1  is positive (0.245) but not significant. 
  The literature on the impact of minimum wages on inequality has generally analyzed the 
impact of changes in the “minimum minimum wage” (rather than the dispersion of minimum 
wages) on wage inequality.  The argument generally made is that an increase in the minimum 
minimum wage will increase the wages of the lowest-paid workers, and therefore reduce the 
inequality of wages by truncating the left tail of the distribution.  To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate an equation similar to equation (2), but that includes the log of real minimum minimum 
wage (lnMinMWit) as an independent variable rather than the standard deviation of the log of 
minimum wages:  
  it t t it 1 0 µ YR γ
T
1 t
Σ  MinMW ln it W SD +
=
+ + = β β ) (ln .       (3) 
A negative and significant coefficient on the real minimum minimum wage variable would 
provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum minimum wage 
reduces inequality in actual wages.  We estimate this equation with data on all workers and less 
educated workers and present the results in Table 4.  In both cases, the coefficient on the real 
minimum minimum wage is positive and insignificant.  These findings allows us to reject the 
hypothesis that an increase in the minimum minimum wage causes a reduction in inequality in 
actual wages in Costa Rica.  
  Finally, to examine the relative impacts of changes in the dispersion and the levels of 
minimum wages, we estimate an equation that includes both the standard deviation of the log of 
the minimum wage and the real value of the minimum minimum wage as independent variables: 
. ) (ln ) (ln 2 1 0    it t t it µ YR γ
T
1 t
Σ  MinMW ln it MW SD it W SD +
=
+ + + = β β β       (4) 
In Table 4, we present the coefficient estimates of β1 and β2 from estimating equations (4) 
using data for all workers and for less educated workers, separately.  These estimated   12
coefficients confirm our previous results.  That is, they provide evidence that changes in the 
dispersion of minimum wages are positively and significantly correlated with the changes in the 
dispersion of the wages of workers without higher education, while changes in the real minimum 
minimum wage do not have statistically significant effects on the dispersion of wages.  This 
finding is important since many studies use the level of the minimum wage as an explanatory 
factor in their analysis of the rising skilled to unskilled wage ratio over time (e.g., Bell, 1997 and 
Cortez, 2001).  Whereas the minimum wage can increase the average wage, it is not clear that it 
should reduce dispersion.  And when only one minimum wage is used in cases when there are 
multiple minimum wage (as in the case of studies of Mexico, e.g. Bell, 1997), then it is not 
surprising that there are no significant results.  
5.  Conclusions 
In summary, we show that Costa Rica experienced rising wage inequality in the 1990s, 
during the period it opened its economy to global forces. We know from Robbins and Gindling 
(1999) that the rise in the relative wages of more skilled workers in Costa Rica could be 
attributed in part to rising demand for more skilled workers due to trade liberalization.  Work by 
Gindling and Trejos (2003) finds a number of other factors that can also help explain rising 
earnings inequality (including changes in the levels or supply of education) but notes there is a 
large part of the change in inequality that they cannot explain with such variables as education, 
gender, region, hours worked or job characteristics.   
In this paper, we test whether minimum wage legislation is part of the missing story.  Our 
examination of Costa Rica’s complex minimum wage structure and its dynamics suggested three 
hypotheses:  (1) The increase in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and 
without higher education cause the gap between the actual wages of workers with and without 
higher education to increase (and therefore cause an increase in wage inequality); (2) The 
reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers without higher education cause a 
reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these workers; and (3) The reduction in the 
inequality of minimum wages for workers with higher education cause a reduction in the 
inequality of actual wages for these workers.   We find that the evidence supports each of these 
three hypotheses. 
 The level of minimum MW was not found to be important in affecting the dispersion of 
wages.  It was expected that the minimum minimum would truncate the left tale of the earnings   13
distribution and as such lower inequality.  However, in a complex system such as that in Costa 
Rica (or Mexico and Argentina), it is not clear the either the minimum MW or the average MW 
should affect the distribution since there are a multitude of wages that can affect the distribution 
at higher levels.  Nevertheless, since many studies have used this variable in trying to explain 
changes in earnings inequality, we thought it worthwhile testing for it as well.  
  In sum, the structure of minimum wages matters, and we found it contributes to wage 
inequality in Costa Rica.  This suggests that countries with an interest in mitigating inequality 
arising from trade liberalization have the levers to do so with a multiple minimum wage policy.  
In Costa Rica, the reduction in the inequality of legal minimum wages from 1987 to 1992 
contributed to a decline in actual wage inequality, mitigating the disequalizing impact of the 
trade liberalization (found by Robbins and Gindling, 1999).   However, when the addition of 
legal minimum wages for university-educated workers in 1993 increased the gap between the 
minimum wages of worker with and without higher education, changes in the structure of 
minimum wages contributed to an increase in wage inequality.  
 
 
 
 
   14
References 
Bell, L. (1997) “The Impact of Minimum Wages in Mexico and Colombia,” Journal of Labor 
Economics, 15(3): S102-S134. 
Berman, E., J. Bound and S. Machin (1998) “Implications of Skill-biased Technological Change: 
International Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4): 1245-1280. 
Card, D. and J. DiNardo (2002) “Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage 
Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles,” NBER Working Paper 8769.      
Cortez, W. W. (2001) “What is Behind Wage Inequality in Mexico?” World Development, 29(11): 
1905-2001. 
DiNardo, J., N. M. Fortin and T. Lemieux (1996) “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of 
Wages, 1973-1992: A Semi parametric Approach.” Econometrica, 64(5): 1001-1044. 
Feenstra, R. and Hanson (1996) “Globalization, Outsourcing and Wage Inequality,” American 
Economic Review, 86 (2): 240-245. 
____________ (1997) “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages: Evidence from Mexico’s 
Maquiladoras,” Journal of International Economics, 42 (?): 371-393. 
Gindling, T.H. and D. Robbins (2001) “Patterns and Sources of Changing Wage Inequality in Chile 
and Costa Rica During Structural Adjustment,” World Development, 29(4): 725-745. 
Gindling, T.H. and J.D. Trejos (2003) “Accounting for Changing Earnings Inequality in Costa Rica, 
1980-1999,” University of Maryland Baltimore Department of Economics Working Paper 
03-108. 
Pavnick, N., A. Blom, P. Goldberg, and N. R. Schady (2002) “Trade Liberalization and Wage and 
Inequality in Brazil”, unpublished paper, the World Bank. 
Robbins, D. and T. H. Gindling (1999)“Trade Liberalization and the Relative Wages of More-
Skilled Workers in Costa Rica, Review  of Development Economics, 3(2): 140-154. 
Rojas, G. and Murillo (1995) “El sistema de salarios mínimos en costa Rica. Origen y evolución,” 
I.L.O, unpublished report. 
Skuratowicz, A. (2000) “Effects of FDI on Wage Inequalities in Poland: Theory and Evidence” 
unpublished paper, Catholic University of Leuven. 
Wu, X. (2001) “The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Relative Return to Skill,” 
Economics of Transition, 9(3): 695-715.   15
COUNTRY REGION OCC IND
Trainee, 
Appren.  or 
Youth
Marital 
Status
Job 
Tenure 
or 
1A u s t r a l i a XX
2A r gentina X
3 Barbados X
4 Belize
* X
5B e n i n X
6B r a z i l   (before 1984) X
7 Burma
** X
8 Burundi XX
9 Cambodia
** XX
10 Canada X
11 Central African Republic XX
12 China
** X
13 Cuba X
14 Czech Republic XX
15 Equitorial Guinea
** X
16 Ethiopia** X
17 Fiji* X
18 Finland X
19 The Gambia X
20 Greece** XX X
21 Guinea-Bissau X
22 Honduras XX
23 India XX
24 Indonesia X
25 Iran XX
26 Italy X
27 Ivory Coast X
28 Japan XX
29 Jordan
30 Luxembourg XX X
31 Malawi* X
32 Malaysia** XX
33 Mauritius XX
34 Mexico XX
35 Morocco* X
36 Mozambique* X
37 Nepal XX
38 Nicaragua X
39 Niger X
40 Pakistan X
41 The Philippines XX
42 Rwanda X
43 Spain X
44 Sri Lanka X
45 Swaziland X
46 Togo X
TOTAL 16 17 22 4 2 2
* Only 2 minimum wages.
** Does not apply to all regions, occupations, or sectors.
Index of Economic Freedom, 2004. The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 
<www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.html>
OECD, 1998.  "Making the Most of the Minimum: Statutory Minimum Wages, Employment and 
Poverty," in Employment Outlook, 1998.
Wailes, Nick and Russell D. Lansbury, 1999.  "Collective bargaining and flexibility: Australia," ILO 
IFP/DIALOGUE Working Papers Series, 1999. 
Table 1: Countries with More Than One Minimum Wage in the Private Sector
Sources:International Labor Organization, Labour Law and Labour Relations Branch’s Briefing Notes at 
the following website: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/legrel/papers/index.htm
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1987
M.W. From To Raise  
January 1 - August 29 ¢0.00 ¢267.00 9.00%  
¢267.05 ¢307.80 7.50%
¢307.85 ¢344.50 5.50%
More than ¢344.5 3.50%
August 30 - December 31 ¢312.80 ¢0.00 4.00%  
¢312.85 ¢322.90 3.00%
More than ¢322.95 2.50%
1988
January 1 - August 15
August 16 - December 31
1989
January 1 - September 16
 September 17 - December 31
1990
January 1 - July 31
August 1 - December 31
1991
January 1 - June 23
June 23 - December 31
1992
January 1 - July 1
July 2 - December 31
Increases from 4% to 26.69%.  Average increase was 11.38%.
Increases from 12.02% to 13.89%.  Average increase was 13.73%.  Exceptions: 
Domestic Servants, 18.72%, Private Accountants, 37.38% and Journalists, 39.58%.
Increases from 3.14% to 25.29%.  Average increase was 9.91%.
Increases from 9.79% to 16.35%.  Average increase was 13.47%
Increases from 2.11% to 15.67%.  Average increase was 9.86%.
Increases from 5.03% to 17.3%.  Average increase was 10.51%
Increases of 8.85% for the lowest salaries down to 2.3% for the highest salaries, with 
exception for domestic servants (9.16%).  Average increase 5.64%.
Increases from 4.76% to 16.81%.  Average increase was 12.16%.
Increases from 3.41% to 8.88%.  Average increase was 6.41%
The major industry categories of manufacturing, mining, electricity and construction 
were combined.  The number of minimum wage categories is reduced to 60-70. 
Consolidation of categories continues.
Table 2:  Summary of Changes in Legal Minimum Wages, Costa Rica 1987 - 1997
Over 500 different minimum wage categories within 10 major industry categories 
(agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, commerce, 
transportation, communications, services, and professionals.) The professional 
category includes a minimum wage for anyone with a "licenciado," a 5-year university 
degree (more common that a 4-year bachelors degree.) The other professional 
minimum wages are for specific professions (and not for anyone with a 2-year or 4-
year degree).
Beginning in 1988 the Ministry of Labor began a gradual process of reducing the 
number of minimum wage categories.  To do this, the Ministry identified two or more 
categories that were to be combined and increased the minimum wage in the category 
with the lowest minimum wage by a greater amount than the minimum wage in the 
higher wage category.  In this way, over a period of several years, the minimum wage 
for these categories would become the same. Therefore, for each category in each year 
minimum wages are increased by different amounts.
As part of the process of gradually consolidating minimum wage categories, for each 
category minimum wages were increased by different absolute amounts: the range is 
3.5-15.0%.  The average increase was 11.0%  17
1993
January 1 - July 26
July 27 - December 31
1994
January 1 - July 30 Increases of 8.00% Agriculture
9.00% Other Activities
July 31 - December 31 9.00% Unskilled ag. labor in Palm Oil
10.00% Bus Drivers 
42.86% "Coyol" harvesters
8.00% All other activities 
1995
January 1 - August 9 Increases of 5.71% "Coyol" harvesters
10.00% all other activities 
August 10 - December 31
1996
January 1 - July 4
July 5 - December 31
1997
January 1 - July 4
July 5 - December 31
Sources: Ministry of Labor and Social Security, National Salary Council, Department of Salaries,
and interviews with Jose Pablo Carvajal (Director, National Salary Council), July 14, 2003 
and Orlando Garcia (Planning Directorate, Ministry of Labor), July 15, 2003.
Increases from 38.08% to 17.78%.  Average increase was 8.35%.
Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%.  Average increase was 8.05%
Increases from 5.70% to 12.83%.  Average increase was 9.69%
Increases from 38.08% to 17.78%.  Average increase was 8.35%.
Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%.  Average increase was 8.05%
The major industry categories were combined into one that specifically includes 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, commerce, tourism, services, 
transport, and warehousing.  Within this combined category four minimum wages are 
set, for unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers, skilled workers and specialized 
workers (supervisors.)   Two other major categories remained: professionals and 
"specials."  "Specials" included a minimum wage for domestic servants.  Within the 
professionals category a minimum wage was added for workers with a 4-year 
university degree.  These changes resulted in only 19 different minimum wages being 
set in 1997.    
Increases from 4.65% to 6.37%.  Average increase was 5.02%
Increases of
Several categories are added for those with higher education.   In addition to the 
already existing minimum wage for "licenciados," legal minimum wages are now set 
for those with 2-3 years of university education ("diplomados" or "tecnicos") and for 
graduates of 5-year technical high schools.
Increases from 4.88% to 14.58%.  Average increase was 5.07%.  18
Table 3: Occupation Codes used by the Costa Rica’s National Statistic and Census Institute 
for the Multi-purpose Housing Surveys, from 1987 to 2000. 
 
 
Groups Description 
0  Professionals and technicians 
00  Professionals and technicians in: architecture, urbanism, technical drawing, engineering and 
industrial engineering technology.   
01  Professionals and technicians in: chemistry, physic, astronomy, geology, bacteriology and 
industrial laboratories. 
02  Professionals and technicians in: agronomy and veterinary medicine, biology, natural sciences, 
and agricultural technology. 
03  Professionals and technicians in: medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, medic technology, 
and paramedic and health activities.   
04  Professionals and technicians in: arts, literature, sports, recreation, communication, advertising, 
organization and social welfare. 
05  Professionals and technicians in: religious and cult activities.   
06  Professionals and technicians in: teaching and research. 
07  Professionals and technicians in: mathematics and statistics, economics, business, accounting 
and social sciences.    
08  Professionals and technicians in: law and jurisprudence.  
09  Professionals and technicians in: maritime, fluvial and air transport and communications. 
1  Directors and general managers 
10  Directors and senior managers in the public administration (executive, legislative and judicial 
powers). 
11  Directors and managers in government institutions with total or partial administrative 
independency and private enterprises: in agricultural and industrial production and trade.  
12  Directors and general managers in government institutions with total or partial administrative 
independency and private enterprises in the service industries.  
2  Office clerks in the government and private enterprises 
20  Office clerks and financial accountant employees in the government (central, regional, local 
levels) and private enterprises.  
21  Accounting and budget employees.  
22  Employees in secretarial activities and transcription and reproduction of texts. 
23  Operators of computers and accounting equipments.  
24  Employees in supervision, delivery and control of transport and communication services.  
25  Employees in mail and message distribution 
26  Employees in the operation of radiotelephony, radiotelegraphy, and telecommunication 
equipment. 
27  Administrative employees in other services.  
3  Traders, retailers, wholesalers and salespersons 
30  Retailers and wholesalers. 
31  Retail salespersons and salesmen on the streets.  
32  Sale representatives – wholesale and manufacturing. 
33  Other salespersons and sale agents,  traders and commission agents 
4  Crop and animal farmers, and agricultural workers.   19
40 Agricultural  Overseers 
41  Crop and animal farmers (owners) 
42 Agricultural  workers 
43 Fishers 
44  Hunters and other workers in hunting. 
45 Forestry  workers 
5  Occupations related to driving, operating and controlling of transportation vehicles. 
50  Drivers of terrestrial transport vehicles. 
51  Railway conductor and stokers. 
52  Conductors and crew of ships and others.   
53  Operators of equipment of transit signals and controls. 
6  Occupations in craft and manufacturing production of textiles and clothing. Also, 
occupations in carpentry, bricklaying, painting, plumbing, mechanic, and electricity. 
60 Textile  workers. 
61  Clothing production workers (except footwear, leather articles and related goods). 
62  Shoemakers, saddlers and related footwear workers 
63  Carpenters, cabinetmakers and related wood workers.  
64  Bricklayers, ceiling installers and other construction workers. 
65  Painters of construction, vehicles, machinery, etc. (except painters and decorators of glass and 
ceramic).  
66  Plumbers or other installers of pipes and metallic structures and welders in general.  
67  Electricians. Operators and repairers of electric and electronic installations and equipment.  
68  Mechanics and repairers of machinery in different sectors: agriculture, manufacture, 
construction and transport.  
69  Watchmakers, opticians, mechanics of precision; jewelers, silversmiths and related workers of 
jewels and objects made of precious metals. 
7  Occupations in craft and manufacturing production in graphic, chemical, mining, metal 
smelting, food product and beverage, ceramic, leather, tobacco and other product 
industries. 
70  Crafts persons and operators of graphic machines.  
71  Miners, mining stonecutters, and operators of mining extraction machinery  
72  Smelters, rolling mill operators and workers related to metal treatments.   
73  Ceramists, potters and glass object producers. 
74  Workers and operators of machinery in chemical, wood, paperboard and corrugated paper 
industries. 
75  Workers and operators of machinery in food product and beverage industries. 
76  Workers in tobacco transformation and cigarette production.  
77  Workers in tanneries and workers related to transformation of skins and leathers. 
78  Other crafts persons and machine operators. 
8  Occupations in packing, loading, and storage 
80  Workers in packing, loading and storage 
9  Personal services and related services. 
90  Workers in vigilance, protection and security.  
91  Cooks, maids, cleaners and occupations in food and beverage service.  
92  Workers in laundry and ironing. 
93  Doormen and building cleaners and managers.  
94 Estheticians 
95  Other workers in personal services. 
98  People working in unidentified occupations. 
  
Sample: Dependent Variable: Minimum Wage
Ratio**
All Workers (1) Wage Ratio** 0.632
a --
(0.156)
  (2) St. Dev. of ln real wage - 0.254 -
 (0.205)
(3) St. Dev. of ln real wage - - 0.0001
 -0.0002
  (4) St. Dev. of ln real wage - 0.253 0.0001
 (0.207) (0.0002)
Less Educated Workers (5) St. Dev. of ln real wage - 0.432
a -
(0.166)
(6) St. Dev. of ln real wage - - 0.0001
-0.0002
  (7) St. Dev. of ln real wage - 0.438
a 0.0001
(0.168) (0.0002)
Higher Educated Workers (8) St. Dev. of ln real wage - 0.817
a -
(0.256)
a=Significant at the 1% confidence level
c=Significant at the 10% confidence level
**The ratio of the wage (or minimum wage) of workers with higher education to the wage (or minimum wage) 
of workers without a higher education.  
Independent Variables:
Table 4: Regressions of Inequality of Wages on Inequality and Level of Minimum Wages*
 
*The regressions use 77 data points (10 years of data on 7 industries) and is estimated with industry and 
time fixed effects.
Real St. Dev. of Log   
of Real MW Min. MW  21
Figure 1: The Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages Among Workers, 1988 and 1997 
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Figure 2: Average MW of Higher Educated Workers to 
Less Educated Workers
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of the Log of Minimum 
Wages
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
All w/ High Ed w/out High Ed
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Standard Deviation of the Log of Wages
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